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Decisions are faster and less accurate when conditions favor speed, and are slower
and more accurate when they favor accuracy. This phenomenon is referred to as the
speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT). Behavioral studies of the SAT have a long history, and
the data from these studies are well characterized within the framework of bounded
integration. According to this framework, decision makers accumulate noisy evidence
until the running total for one of the alternatives reaches a bound. Lower and higher
bounds favor speed and accuracy respectively, each at the expense of the other. Studies
addressing the neural implementation of these computations are a recent development
in neuroscience. In this review, we describe the experimental and theoretical evidence
provided by these studies. We structure the review according to the framework of
bounded integration, describing evidence for (1) the modulation of the encoding of
evidence under conditions favoring speed or accuracy, (2) the modulation of the integration
of encoded evidence, and (3) the modulation of the amount of integrated evidence
sufficient to make a choice. We discuss commonalities and differences between the
proposed neural mechanisms, some of their assumptions and simplifications, and open
questions for future work. We close by offering a unifying hypothesis on the present state
of play in this nascent research field.
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review
1. INTRODUCTION
The ability to trade-off speed and accuracy against each other is
a hallmark of decision making across species and tasks (Chittka
et al., 2009; Bogacz et al., 2010a; Heitz and Schall, 2012). For a
given task difficulty, decisions are typically faster and less accurate
when conditions favor speed, and are slower and more accurate
when conditions favor accuracy. Given the near-ubiquity of this
behavior in experiments, the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) can
almost be considered a psychophysical law. It can also be con-
sidered a cognitive phenomenon, since it captures a change in
strategy toward an ostensibly unchanging task.
The SAT has long been the subject of behavioral experiments
(Fitts, 1966; Wickelgren, 1977), but studies addressing its neu-
ral basis are a fairly recent development in the field of decision
making (Bogacz et al., 2010b). These studies have built on a large
body of work on the neural basis of decisions more generally.
This work has characterized the computations underlying deci-
sions (see Smith and Ratcliff, 2004; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008),
identified neural correlates of these computations (see Schall,
2001; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2009) and
provided mechanistic hypotheses that explain behavioral data in
terms of neural data (see Wang, 2008, 2012). This body of work
provides a persuasive account of neural decision processing, but
does not speak directly to the mechanisms by which decision pro-
cessing is differentially modulated by conditions favoring speed
or accuracy.
In this review, we describe hypotheses on the neural imple-
mentation of the SAT. We take a modeling perspective. We
classify models according to two general levels of abstraction,
sometimes referred to as the algorithmic level and the level of
implementation (Marr, 1982). These classes need not be consid-
ered discrete, but rather, can be considered as the extreme ends
of a continuum. At one end, algorithmic models characterize the
computations underlying brain function. At the other end, neu-
ral models address the implementation of these computations. In
the domain of decision making, analytic studies have shown the
assumptions and constraints under which implementation-level
models are formally equivalent to algorithmic models, providing
a principled foundation for considering the latter in terms of the
former (Bogacz et al., 2006). We endeavor to utilize the flexibility
and explanatory power of this modeling perspective.
Our review is structured according to the framework of
bounded integration. This framework not only provides a set
of organizing principles for the review, but provides the back-
ground for this collection more generally. Most of the neural and
behavioral data we consider were recorded from perceptual deci-
sion tasks. We assume that the neural mechanisms underlying
perceptual decisions generalize to other kinds of decisions, but
the sources of evidence differ according to the decision domain
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Sensory systems and memory systems
provide examples of sources of evidence. We begin by defining
the SAT (Section 2). We then describe bounded integration as a
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computational framework for characterizing decisions (Section
3), along with a widely held hypothesis on the neural imple-
mentation of these computations (Section 3.1). We categorize
hypotheses on the SAT according to the major components of
the bounded integration framework, describing the evidence for
differential modulation of these components under speed and
accuracy conditions (Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3). We close with a
discussion of the assumptions underlying these hypotheses, the
relationship between mechanisms, and some open questions for
future research (Section 5).
2. DEFINING THE SPEED-ACCURACY TRADE-OFF
In decision tasks, subjects must determine which decision alterna-
tive is favored by the evidence. If the evidence for one alternative
is clearly stronger than the evidence for the others, the task is
easy. Conversely, if the evidence for each alternative is similar,
the task is difficult. Accuracy decreases with task difficulty, while
decision times increase, characterizing the common psychometric
and chronometric curves respectively (Figure 1). Task difficulty
therefore imposes a systematic relationship between the speed
and accuracy of decisions (see Stone, 2014 in this collection), but
these curves do not define the SAT. The SAT refers to changes
in the speed and accuracy of decisions for a given task difficulty.
While many decision tasks manipulate the strength of evidence,
this experimental parameter need not vary in SAT experiments.
The SAT captures a control mechanism for decision process-
ing, and can be further distinguished according to the timescale
of adjustments to speed and accuracy conditions. Over longer
timescales, the SAT may be accomplished by adaptive mecha-
nisms that extract a balance between the speed and accuracy of
decisions in order to maximize reward over a block of trials (Gold
and Shadlen, 2002; Simen et al., 2006; Furman and Wang, 2008;
Standage et al., 2011). This approach has been demonstrated
by algorithmic models (Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Bogacz et al.,
2010a), biophysically-based neural models (Lo and Wang, 2006;
Furman and Wang, 2008) and models in between these levels of
abstraction (Simen et al., 2006). In contrast, experimental sub-
jects often learn to respond to speed or accuracy conditions from
trial to trial, according to a pre-trial cue (Forstmann et al., 2008;
Heitz and Schall, 2012). We point out this difference because
we are unaware of any implementation-level models to simu-
late trial-to-trial switching of response “modes” for speed and
accuracy. Since there is an optimal trade-off for each condition
that depends on its associated reward schedule, it is plausible
that long-timescale mechanisms correspond to a learning phase
for each response mode; however, it is important to note that
switching between speed and accuracy modes necessarily involves
additional mechanisms to associate the cues with the appropriate
mode, and to switch between modes on cue.
3. THE BOUNDED INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK
Under the bounded integration framework, the evidence for each
alternative of a decision is integrated until the running total
for one of the alternatives reaches a criterion level. Thus, the
bound refers to the criterion and integration refers to the accu-
mulation of evidence. The accumulated evidence for a given
alternative is referred to as a decision variable. According to
FIGURE 1 | The psychometric and chronometric curves. Decisions are
faster and less accurate with increasing task difficulty, describing a
relationship between speed and accuracy. For a given task difficulty,
decisions are faster and less accurate under conditions favoring speed, and
are slower and more accurate under conditions favoring accuracy. This
phenomenon is depicted by the arrows on either side of the central data
point on each curve, where speed and accuracy conditions correspond to
black and gray arrows respectively.
this sequential sampling approach (see Ratcliff and Smith, 2004;
Smith and Ratcliff, 2004), integration is necessary because neu-
ral processing of the evidence is noisy, as may be the evidence
itself. By integrating the evidence over time, an average is com-
puted, so that decisions are not based on moment-to-moment
fluctuations in the evidence or its processing. The longer the
integration period, the better the average and the higher the
probability of identifying the alternative with the most evidence.
Clearly, speed and accuracy make conflicting demands under this
framework.
Bounded integration subsumes a number of algorithmic mod-
els. Most generally, these models can be distinguished according
to whether the evidence for each choice is integrated indepen-
dently from the others, or whether the evidence for each choice
serves as evidence against the others. The former are often
referred to as race models (Figure 2A) and the latter as dif-
fusion models (Figure 2C). A flexible approach between these
extremes is provided by competing accumulator models (Usher
and McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2007; Purcell et al., 2012),
in which decision variables for the respective alternatives are
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FIGURE 2 | Three classes of bounded integrator model. Each model
receives the same two noisy stimuli, one with a higher mean (target T, solid)
than the other (distractor D, dotted). Curves in the upper figures correspond
to integrators (decision variables DV), depicted in the lower figure. (A)
Independent race model of a 2-choice decision. The black horizontal line bs
corresponds to a low decision bound, supporting faster decisions that are
less likely to identify the target. The gray horizontal line ba corresponds to a
higher bound, favoring the accurate identification of the target at the expense
of processing time. The independence of the integrators is depicted in the
lower figure. (B) Competing accumulator model. The weight (w) of
subtraction between the two integrators is depicted in the lower figure.
Different values of this weight would yield different curves. (C) Drift diffusion
model. The decision variable is the integrated difference between the two
stimuli. Black (bs) and gray (ba) horizontal lines correspond to bounds favoring
speed and accuracy respectively. In each panel, the gray shaded region
depicts the time of crossing of the lower (speed condition) threshold.
subtracted from one another according to a scaling parameter
or weight (Figure 2C). In 2-choice tasks, the weight of sub-
traction can effectively (though not always formally) interpolate
between the independent race model and the diffusion model,
i.e., it controls the strength of competition between accumulators.
Moreover, competing accumulators accommodate tasks with any
number of choices and they provide an important link between
models at the algorithmic level and the implementation level (see
the next section). For an intuitive description of the formal rela-
tionships between race models, diffusion models and competing
accumulators, see Bogacz (2007). For a rigorous mathematical
treatment, see Bogacz et al. (2006).
This brief description of bounded integration warrants several
technical points. Firstly, integration refers to the accumulation of
evidence in continuous time, but for simplicity, we do not dis-
tinguish accumulation in discrete time from the continuous-time
case. Secondly, the benefits of integration depend on the timescale
of noise correlations. Thirdly, we only consider unbiased tasks, in
which the bound (or its mean) is the same for each alternative,
as is the starting value (or its mean) of each decision variable.
Note that “unbiased” does not imply that the mean evidence for
each alternative is equal, but rather, the prior probability of each
alternative is equal. The framework is readily extended to biased
conditions (see Gold and Shadlen, 2001). For a comprehensive
description of bounded integration, see Smith and Ratcliff (2004);
Bogacz et al. (2006).
3.1. INTERPRETING BOUNDED INTEGRATOR MODELS
As noted in the Introduction, bounded integrator models can be
thought of as abstract algorithms that characterize the computa-
tions underlying decisions. From this perspective, the terms and
parameters of these models are independent of their implemen-
tation and do not require explicit neural interpretation. On the
other hand, it can be instructive to interpret these parameters in
neural terms if they resemble neural activity. As such, the evi-
dence in perceptual decision tasks corresponds to the response
by sensory (and sensory-association) neurons to task-relevant
stimuli, and decision variables correspond to the activity of down-
stream neural populations hypothesized to integrate this activity.
Accordingly, the starting point of a decision variable is commonly
equated with the baseline (pre-trial) level of integrator activity
and the bound is commonly equated with the level of this activity
at the time of commitment to a choice (see Bogacz et al., 2010b).
There is considerable evidence supporting this general inter-
pretation. For example, in random dot motion (RDM) tasks,
subjects are rewarded for identifying the direction of coherent
movement of a proportion of randomly moving dots on a com-
puter screen. The coherence of the dots provides the evidence
in the task, which can be precisely controlled by the experi-
menter. Neurons in the medial temporal area (MT) of monkeys
are responsive to movement of the dots (Britten et al., 1992,
1993), and in tasks in which monkeys indicate their choices by
making an eye-movement to a visual target, neurons in the lat-
eral intraparietal area (LIP) that are responsive to the chosen
target (target-in neurons) show buildup activity prior to choice
selection (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008).
Since MT projects to LIP, it is widely believed that neurons in
LIP integrate the evidence provided by MT, projecting in turn to
the circuitry mediating eye-movements (see Gold and Shadlen,
2007; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013). Note that neural correlates of
decision variables in RDM tasks have also been recorded in
other cortical areas, e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)
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(Kim and Shadlen, 1999) and the frontal eye fields (FEF) (Ding
and Gold, 2012). Similar data have been recorded from these and
other brain regions in different task paradigms, described below
in relation to SAT experiments. Importantly, electrophysiologi-
cal recordings from neurons responsive to a visual target that is
not chosen on a given trial (target-out neurons) typically show a
much lower rate of activity than target-in neurons prior to choice
selection (e.g., Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Thomas and Pare,
2007; Bollimunta and Ditterich, 2011; Ding and Gold, 2012).
Taken together, increasing activity by target-in neurons and sup-
pressed activity by target-out neurons have been interpreted as
revealing competitive interactions between neural decision vari-
ables (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wang, 2002; Albantakis and
Deco, 2009; Standage and Pare, 2011). In competing accumula-
tor models, each accumulator can be thought of as a population
of neurons responsive to one of the alternatives, where the weight
of subtraction corresponds to the strength of inhibition between
these populations (Figure 2B).
Competing accumulator models can also have parameters gov-
erning leakage and recurrent excitation of decision variables,
both of which are important for interpreting these models in
neural terms. To begin with, neurons leak, e.g., membrane poten-
tial and synaptic activation decay. Importantly, the relevant time
constants of decay (e.g., the time of decay from maximum to
half-maximum) are on the order of tens of milliseconds, whereas
perceptual decision times are typically in the range of several
hundreds of milliseconds. Thus, the time constants of these cur-
rents are not long enough to support temporal integration. Such
long integration times are believed to require recurrent excitation
(Wang, 2002), provided by synaptic connectivity within a popu-
lation of excitatory neurons responsive to a given alternative. To
provide an idealized example, if the leakage and inhibitory synap-
tic currents of individual neurons (responding linearly to their
inputs) were precisely offset by the strength of recurrent exci-
tation from other neurons in the population, then each neuron
would support perfect integration of evidence, limited only by
its maximum firing rate. In reality, local-circuit dynamics con-
strain the length of time each population can support integration,
described in the next section.
This neural interpretation of competing accumulator models
sets the stage for our consideration of the neural basis of the SAT.
In bounded integrator models, we interpret noisy evidence as
the response by populations of sensory (and sensory-association)
neurons to stimuli in perceptual tasks. We interpret temporal
integration as the buildup activity of neural populations receiving
projections from sensory neurons. We interpret the starting point
of a decision variable as the activity of integrator populations at
the time of evidence onset (the baseline rate), and for simplicity,
we interpret the bound as the rate of integrator activity at the time
of commitment to a choice.We consider another interpretation of
the bound in Section 4.2.1.
3.1.1. Attractor dynamics
The time over which competing neural populations can integrate
evidence is an emergent property of network dynamics. The rel-
evant dynamics are most easily described for 2-choice decisions,
but are applicable tomore than two decision alternatives (You and
Wang, 2013). As noted above, when the activity of an integrator
population builds up in a 2-choice task, it suppresses the other
population by recurrent inhibition. The eventual state of high-
rate activity by one population and low-rate activity by the other
is an attractor in the space of possible states of the network, and
the increase in activity by the “winning” population and the sup-
pression of the losing population (Figure 3B) corresponds to a
descent into its basin of attraction (Figure 3C). The attractors are
stable states of the network, that is, the state of the network evolves
toward these states for a given set of conditions. Once there, the
mean activity of the network is fixed until conditions change, such
as the offset of evidence. In the domain of decision making, the
“getting there” is the decision process.
The attractors are separated by an unstable steady state, toward
which the network is drawn with the onset of the evidence,
and from which it is repelled toward one of the two attractors
(Figure 3C). The dynamics in the vicinity of the unstable steady
state are slow, supporting temporal integration. The time over
which integration is supported is referred to as the effective time
constant of the network, and corresponds to the rate at which the
dynamics evolve near this state. See Wong and Wang (2006) for
a thorough description of the dynamics. The crucial point here is
that the effective time constant is shorter with stronger recurrent
dynamics, limiting the amount of time the network can integrate
evidence. Accordingly, moderate dynamics can be considered to
support neutral conditions, where stronger and weaker dynam-
ics support speed and accuracy conditions respectively. We refer
to local-circuit dynamics with these properties as the “decision
regime.” We refer to weaker dynamics without these properties as
the “leakage regime.” In the leakage regime, the effective time con-
stant of the network is similar in principle to the time constant of
decay of membrane potential or synaptic activation, though it can
be considerably longer. In the decision regime, the effective time
constant does not correspond to leakage; rather, it corresponds to
an amplification of the decision variable, and is thus qualitatively
different than a time constant of decay (see Standage et al., 2011).
4. THREE GENERAL MECHANISTIC HYPOTHESES ON THE
SAT
Hypotheses on the neural implementation of the SAT must pro-
vide mechanistic explanations for differential decision processing
under speed and accuracy conditions. Under the principles of
bounded integration, these hypotheses can be grouped into three
mutually-compatible classes: modulation of the encoding of evi-
dence, modulation of the integration of encoded evidence, and
modulation of the amount of integrated evidence sufficient to
make a choice. In principle, each class of hypothesis (and each
mechanistic hypothesis in each class) is sufficient to account
for the SAT, but we do not favor any one hypothesis over the
others. Rather, we believe the SAT is likely to result from the
interplay of multiple mechanisms, with different mechanisms (or
combinations of mechanisms) playing a greater role in different
contexts.
The three general classes of hypothesis provide an intuitive
basis for organizing the review, but they also correspond to three
successive processing stages of decisions: the encoding of evi-
dence, the integration of encoded evidence, and choosing. Under
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FIGURE 3 | (A) A neural implementation of the principles of bounded
integration. Neural populations selective for the decision alternatives (T and
D) compete via a common inhibitory pool (solid black circle). Arcs with
arrows and filled circles depict excitatory and inhibitory synaptic
connectivity respectively. Target (T) and distractor (D) stimuli provide
stronger and weaker evidence to the integrator populations respectively.
(B) Competitive interactions between integrator populations lead to an
increased spike rate by one population (solid) and a decreased rate by the
other (dotted). (C) Cartoon depiction of an attractor “energy landscape”
supported by the neural model, where the energy decreases over time. An
unstable steady state (high energy) separates two attractors (low energy),
corresponding to the target and the distractor. The ball depicts the state of
the network, which is drawn toward the unstable steady state at stimulus
onset (vertical arrow), and from which it is repelled toward one of the
“attractor basins” (bent arrows). Descent into the attractor basin
corresponds to the firing-rate excursion of the target population in (B),
where the vertical line approximates the position of the ball in (C). The
evolution of the network state (conceptually, the movement of the ball) is
faster (slower) under speed (accuracy) conditions.
the attractor framework, the computational requirements of these
stages are supported by weak, moderate and strong local-circuit
dynamics respectively. Weak dynamics support the encoding of
evidence by “giving way” to their inputs, i.e., the dynamics are
dominated by leakage. Moderately strong dynamics furnish a long
effective time constant, supporting temporal integration (Section
3.1.1). Strong dynamics furnish a short effective time constant
within the decision regime, allowing an all-or-none response to
a critical level of input (see Simen, 2012). Thus, the principles
of bounded integration are captured by a three-stage neural sys-
tem, in which evidence-encoding circuitry with weak dynamics
projects to integrator circuitry with moderate dynamics, which in
turn projects to thresholding circuitry with strong dynamics. This
three-stage process is depicted in Figure 4.
Finally, it is important to clarify our usage of several terms
before proceeding with the review. We define the “correct” alter-
native as the one for which the evidence has the highest mean, and
as suggested in Section 2, we define task difficulty as the difference
between the mean of the evidence for the correct alternative and
that for the alternative with the next highest mean. Task difficulty
overlaps with the rate of integration in bounded integrator mod-
els, but this overlap depends on model specifics. For example, in
race models, increasing the evidence for the correct alternative
increases its integration rate (there’s more instantaneous input
to accumulate) and reduces task difficulty if the evidence for
the other alternatives is not increased; however, increasing the
evidence for each alternative by the same amount increases the
integration rate of each integrator, but does not influence task
difficulty. In diffusion models, an increase in the evidence for the
correct alternative necessarily decreases task difficulty, unless the
FIGURE 4 | Three processing stages for decisions: the encoding of
evidence (left), the integration of encoded evidence (middle) and
choice selection (right). Evidence-encoding populations (left) are
responsive to target (T) and distractor (D) stimuli. Weak dynamics prevent
integration, depicted by the lack of recurrent connectivity.
Evidence-encoding populations project to integrator populations (middle).
Feedback connectivity depicts moderately strong dynamics, suitable for
temporal integration (corresponding to Figure 3). Integrator populations
project to thresholding circuitry (right). Thick connectivity depicts very
strong dynamics, suitable to an all-or none response to a critical level of
input (see Simen, 2012).
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the evidence is preserved. Here, it
is important to remember our definition of the SAT in Section
2: improvements in speed (accuracy) at the expense of accuracy
(speed) for a given task difficulty. In Section 4.2.1, we describe
hypotheses on the neural implementation of the SAT by modula-
tion of the rate of integration. We define the rate of integration
as the inverse of the difference between the rate of integrator
neurons at the time of commitment to a choice and their base-
line rate. These considerations highlight two important points.
Firstly, the hypotheses in Section 4.2.1 do not refer to changes
in integration rate resulting solely from upstream changes to the
encoding of evidence (support for this possibility is described in
Section 4.1). Secondly, these hypotheses address the neural mech-
anisms by which the rate of rise of putative integrator activity is
modulated by speed and accuracy conditions, not task difficulty.
4.1. MODULATION OF THE ENCODING OF EVIDENCE
Evidence for the modulation of sensory processing under speed
and accuracy conditions (Figure 5A) has been shown in a visual
search task, in which monkeys were rewarded for making a sac-
cade to a target stimulus, while single-cell activity was recorded
from FEF (Heitz and Schall, 2012). A substantial body of electro-
physiological data from visual decision tasks indicates that FEF
neurons can be classified as visual neurons and movement neu-
rons (Cohen et al., 2010; Purcell et al., 2010). Visual neurons
are responsive to task-relevant stimuli, but do not show saccade-
related activity, whereas movement neurons show saccade-related
activity, but do not respond to stimuli. As such, movement neu-
rons are hypothesized to integrate the evidence encoded by visual
neurons (the first and second stages of Figure 4), loosely anal-
ogous to the hypothesis that LIP neurons integrate the activity
of MT neurons in RDM tasks (Section 3.1). In the study by
(Heitz and Schall, 2012), the SAT was correlated with multiple
adjustments to the activity of both classes of neuron, including
the baseline rate of visual neurons (Figure 6A), the magnitude
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FIGURE 5 | Hypotheses on the neural implementation of the SAT,
under the framework of bounded integration. Each panel is an instance
of the 3-stage schematic in Figure 4. (A) Modulation of the encoding of
evidence. A cognitive signal adjusts the gain of sensory encoding
populations (dashed arcs). This multiplicative effect is depicted by the “X”
in the open circle at the top. (B) Modulation of the rate of integration of
encoded evidence (dashed arcs). The cognitive signal adjusts the gain of
integrator circuitry, controlling the rate of integration. (C) Modulation of the
onset of integration of encoded evidence. An inhibitory gate (G) controls
the onset of integration (dotted arcs). (D) Modulation of the sensitivity of
integrator circuitry to encoded evidence. Integrator populations are
selective for different sub-populations of evidence-encoding neurons under
speed and accuracy conditions, depicted by the black (speed) and gray
(accuracy) arcs. (E) Modulation of the amount of non-evidence input to
integrator circuitry. All integrator populations receive a uniform cognitive
signal, in addition (+) to evidence (dotted arcs). (F) Modulation of the
amount of non-integrator input to thresholding circuitry. Neural populations
enacting choice behavior receive a uniform cognitive signal, in addition (+)
to integrated evidence (dotted arcs). (G) Modulation of the connectivity
between integrator circuitry and thresholding circuitry. The amount of
integrated evidence sufficient to make a choice is modulated by the
strength of connectivity from integrators to the circuitry enacting choice
behavior (thick horizontal arrows).
of their response to stimuli (Figure 6B) and the time at which
target-in activity can be discriminated from target-out activ-
ity (Figure 6B). To summarize, the search array was identical
across conditions, but the baseline rates and response magnitude
of visual neurons were higher, and the time of discrimination
was earlier, under the speed condition, in which the monkeys
made faster, less accurate decisions. Conversely, baseline rates and
response magnitude were lower, and discrimination was later,
under the accuracy condition, in which themonkeysmade slower,
more accurate decisions.
These data provide strong support for the hypothesis that
the modulation of the encoding of evidence contributes to the
SAT, but the data alone do not explain the underlying neural
mechanism. Gain modulation provides an explanation. The base-
line rates of target-in and target-out visual neurons were higher
(lower) under speed (accuracy) conditions (solid and dashed
curves before stimulus onset in Figure 6B), suggesting that visual
neurons received a common signal, regardless of whether they
were encoding evidence for the target or a distractor. Spatially
non-selective (global, uniform, diffuse) excitation is an estab-
lished form of gain modulation in attractor models (Salinas and
Abbott, 1996; Furman andWang, 2008; Standage et al., 2013), so a
stronger (weaker) common signal under speed (accuracy) condi-
tions would account for the higher (lower) response magnitude
of visual neurons. If the SNR of encoded evidence were unaf-
fected (or lowered) by this signal, then other things being equal,
higher-rate activity by visual neurons under the speed condition
would be manifest in a higher rate of integration of this activity
by movement neurons, supporting fewer sequential samples and
therefore improved speed at the expense of accuracy (vice versa for
the accuracy condition). This scenario is equivalent to adjusting
a decision bound. Consistent with this possibility, the rate of rise
of movement-neuron activity was higher (lower) under the speed
(accuracy) condition in the study by Heitz and Schall (2012). In
the next section, we provide another, compatible explanation of
these movement-neuron data.
4.2. MODULATION OF THE INTEGRATION OF ENCODED EVIDENCE
Mechanistic hypotheses on the trading of speed and accuracy by
modulation of the integration of evidence can be grouped into
three mutually compatible categories: modulation of the rate of
integration (Figure 5B), modulation of the onset of integration
(Figure 5C) and modulation of the sensitivity to the encoding of
evidence (Figure 5D). As noted above, the first hypothesis does
not refer to changes in the rate of integration resulting solely from
changes in the evidence or its encoding. Rather, we refer to mech-
anisms hypothesized to actively target integrator circuitry in this
section, regardless of upstream or downstream modulation.
4.2.1. Modulation of the rate of integration of evidence
The study by Heitz and Schall (2012) not only provides evi-
dence for the differential modulation of sensory encoding with
speed and accuracy conditions, but also for the modulation of
the rate of integration of evidence (Figure 5B). In their study,
the slope of pre-saccadic activity by movement neurons in FEF
was shown to increase and decrease under speed and accuracy
conditions respectively (Figure 6C). As noted in Section 4.1,
these changes could simply result from the increase (decrease)
in gain of visual neurons under speed (accuracy) conditions;
however, they can be explained by the modulation of local-
circuit (recurrent) dynamics (Figure 3), independent of upstream
changes. Increasing the strength of recurrent dynamics shortens
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FIGURE 6 | Electrophysiological data recorded from FEF during a visual
search task under speed (black) and accuracy (gray) conditions (Heitz
and Schall, 2012). (A) The baseline rate of visual (evidence-encoding)
neurons was higher and lower under speed and accuracy conditions
respectively (stimulus onset at 0ms). (B) The gain of visual neurons was
higher (lower) under speed (accuracy) conditions. (C) The slope of
movement neuron activity was higher (lower) under speed (accuracy)
conditions. (D) The peak of movement neuron activity was higher (lower)
under speed (accuracy) conditions. Data aligned to saccade initiation. Figure
adapted from Heitz and Schall (2012) with permission of © Elsevier.
the effective time constant of local-circuit models (Wong and
Wang, 2006; Standage et al., 2011), so the decision variable builds
up more quickly, limiting the amount of integrated evidence.
Decisions are consequently faster and less accurate. Conversely,
decreasing the strength of recurrent dynamics lengthens the effec-
tive time constant, so the decision variable builds up more slowly
and decisions are slower and more accurate. Here, it is worth
noting that the computational role of the effective time con-
stant is identical to that of the bound, operating at a different
level of abstraction; it controls the duration of the integration
of evidence. Thus, while it is intuitive to interpret the bound in
terms of the firing rates of integrator neurons, the bound may be
implemented by any mechanism that controls integration time.
Lengthening and shortening the effective time constant of
a decision circuit offers a sound principle for trading speed
and accuracy, but it requires a mechanism (or mechanisms) to
increase and decrease the strength of recurrent dynamics under
speed and accuracy conditions respectively. There are several pos-
sibilities, such as spatially non-selective excitation of excitatory
neurons (Furman and Wang, 2008; Standage et al., 2013) or the
conductance strength of excitatory recurrent synapses (Wong and
Wang, 2006; Standage and Pare, 2011). Furman and Wang (2008)
used the first of these mechanisms in simulations of an RDM task
with a biophysically-based local-circuit model. They simulated
the experiments by Churchland et al. (2008), who recorded from
LIP neurons while monkeys chose between two or four possible
directions of motion. Not only did Furman and Wang (2008)
qualitatively reproduce neural and behavioral data from the task,
but they further considered the effects of speed and accuracy
emphasis that were not tested experimentally. They hypothesized
that the SAT is controlled by a stationary “top-down” signal, test-
ing their hypothesis by providing non-selective spike trains to all
pyramidal neurons in the network, in addition to the selective
spike trains simulating motion evidence from area MT. Stronger
non-selective input produced faster, less accurate decisions in the
model. Furman and Wang (2008) did not show network activity
under the different non-selective input rates, but it is clear from
other modeling studies that the slope of network activity is higher
(lower) with stronger (weaker) recurrent dynamics, correspond-
ing to speed (accuracy) emphasis (e.g., Wong and Wang, 2006;
Standage and Pare, 2011). Notably, the baseline rates of target-
in and target-out movement neurons in the electrophysiological
study by Heitz and Schall (2012) were higher (lower) under speed
(accuracy) conditions, consistent with the modulation of local-
circuit dynamics by a spatially non-selective signal. Note that such
a signal is consistent with the use of the term “urgency” in some
studies, i.e., speed (accuracy) conditions entail a higher (lower)
urgency to respond (Reddi and Carpenter, 2000), though we
restrict our usage of this term to time-dependent signals below,
i.e., the urgency to respond increases with the duration of a deci-
sion (Churchland et al., 2008; Cisek et al., 2009; Standage et al.,
2011).
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Where Furman and Wang (2008) used a stationary signal to
differentially modulate decision dynamics under speed and accu-
racy conditions, Standage et al. (2011) used a timing (urgency)
signal, hypothesizing that an estimate of one’s temporal con-
straints is sufficient to trade speed and accuracy with a fixed level
of integrator activity at decision time. They used a model from
the same family as that of Furman and Wang (2008), but they
took a more abstract population rate approach, where a “trans-
fer function” determines the proportion of an idealized neural
population activated by its input (Wilson and Cowan, 1972;
Gerstner, 2000). The timing signal was an increasing function of
time, building up more quickly with tighter temporal constraints,
but reaching a fixed maximum (see Durstewitz, 2004). The sig-
nal scaled the slope parameter of the transfer function, which
in turn controlled the dynamics of the network (the higher the
slope parameter, the stronger the dynamics). As such, network
dynamics were weak at the start of each trial, but were strength-
ened with elapsed time. This progression lengthened the time
constant of the network prior to entry into the decision regime,
and then shortened it (Figure 7B). Decision-selective firing rates
were fixed at decision time because the network always pro-
gressed through the same dynamic regimes, but slower buildup
of the timing signal allowed the network to spend more time in
regimes with a longer time constant. Thus, the slope of integra-
tor activity was lower (higher) with longer (shorter) temporal
constraints, and decisions were slower (faster) and more (less)
accurate (Figures 7C,D). Standage et al. (2011) compared this
approach to the modulation of the network by a stationary signal,
showing that time-dependent modulation systematically earned
more reward per unit time. In effect, time-dependent modulation
of attractor dynamics makes a better use of time than station-
ary modulation, but human and non-human animals do not
necessarily make decisions this way. The model makes testable
predictions for experiments, which are an important next step for
this hypothesis (see the Discussion).
What neural mechanisms could implement stationary
(Furman and Wang, 2008; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008) and
time-dependent (Standage et al., 2011, 2013) top-down signals
for controlling the speed and accuracy of decisions? A stationary
signal could be provided by persistent, goal-directed activity,
for which there is abundant evidence in prefrontal and parietal
cortical areas (see Wang, 2001). This mechanism would require
an additional means to control the rate of persistent activity. Like
integration time, the rate of persistent activity in local-circuit
cortical models can be controlled by the strength of recurrent
dynamics (Brunel and Wang, 2001). Thus, any mechanism that
modulates recurrent dynamics in the circuitry mediating the
control signal would in turn control the strength of non-selective
input to downstream integrator circuitry, and thereby the SAT. To
switch between speed and accuracy response modes from trial to
trial (e.g., Forstmann et al., 2008; Heitz and Schall, 2012), higher
and lower rates of persistent activity would need to be associated
with the cues for speed and accuracy conditions respectively.
There is also abundant evidence for the encoding of elapsed
time by “climbing activity,” i.e., activity that peaks at the time of
an anticipated event, such as a deadline (see Durstewitz, 2004).
Such prospective coding (Rainer et al., 1999; Komura et al., 2001)
has been recorded during tasks with a timing requirement in a
number of cortical areas (Niki and Watanabe, 1979; Rainer et al.,
1999; Maimon and Assad, 2006; Shuler and Bear, 2006). Standage
et al. (2013) built on their earlier population ratemodel (Standage
et al., 2011) with a biophysically-based, coupled-circuit cortical
model, offering a neural implementation of the timing signal, and
demonstrating its modulation of downstream decision dynamics
by spatially non-selective excitation. To switch between speed and
accuracy responsemodes from trial to trial, the shorter and longer
timing signals would need to be associated with the cues for speed
and accuracy conditions respectively.
It is worth noting that time-dependent attractor models
Standage et al. (2011, 2013) are conceptually similar to bounded
integrator models in which the bound is lowered over the course
of each trial (Ditterich, 2006b; Drugowitsch et al., 2012), but
the former cannot be considered a neural implementation of the
latter. The underlying premise of the latter is that longer process-
ing time implies a more difficult decision and therefore a lower
probability of a correct response. Lowering the bound reduces
time-wasting because it speeds up decisions that are more likely
to be wrong, increasing reward rate. This approach is function-
ally equivalent to the time-dependent multiplication of incoming
evidence (Ditterich, 2006b). Expressed as a bounded integrator
model, the time-dependent attractor models by Standage et al.
(2011, 2013) implement the time-dependent multiplication of
evidence and the evolving decision variable, making different
predictions about the sensitivity of decisions to the timing of
evidence than other bounded integrator models (see Section 5.1).
4.2.2. Modulation of the onset of integration
It is possible that speed and accuracy conditions modulate the
onset of evidence integration (Figure 5C), as opposed to (or in
addition to) the rate of integration. Purcell et al. (2012) tested this
hypothesis with a leaky competing accumulator model, in which
the accumulators received the activity of visually-responsive neu-
rons in FEF, recorded during a visual search task. The accumula-
tor corresponding to the target received the activity of target-in
neurons, while the other accumulators received the activity of
target-out neurons. Each accumulator received a fixed inhibitory
signal serving as a gate, preventing the accumulation of activity
prior to the search array, that is, the gate dictated that evidence
was only accumulated if it exceeded a minimum rate. The model
was fit to behavioral data from monkeys performing the search
task and to electrophysiological recordings from FEF movement
neurons. In simulations of an SAT experiment, adjustments to the
inhibitory gate were compared to adjustments to the bound. Both
parameters accounted for the SAT and maximized reward rate,
but they made different predictions about the activity of move-
ment neurons. As expected, adjustments to the bound predicted
a higher (lower) rate of activity at the time of commitment to
a choice under accuracy (speed) conditions, but did not impact
baseline activity or the onset of integration. Adjustments to the
inhibitory gate predicted higher (lower) baseline activity and
earlier (later) onset of integration under speed (accuracy) condi-
tions. To the best of our knowledge, the activity of FEF movement
neurons in the study by Heitz and Schall (2012) provide the only
available single-cell data to test these predictions. These data do
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FIGURE 7 | (A) A control signal (c) modulating local-circuit decision
processing. The signal could be implemented by persistent, goal directed
activity (Stationary) or by climbing activity, encoding elapsed time relative to a
deadline (Timing). The model schematic is the same as in Figure 3A, with the
addition of the control signal. (B) Under stationary modulation, the decision
network can support a single time constant of integration for a given trial,
depicted by the horizontal lines. A stronger control signal furnishes a shorter
time constant. Under time-dependent modulation, the time constant of
integration increases in the leakage regime, before contracting in the
decision regime. This progression occurs more quickly with faster buildup of
the signal. Black and gray curves correspond to speed and accuracy
conditions. (C) Target and distractor-selective firing rates in a simulated
decision circuit for each timing signal. The slope of decision-selective activity
is higher for shorter timing signals. (D) Psychometric and chronometric
curves corresponding to each timing signal. (B–D) are adapted from
Standage et al. (2011).
not support the predictions of the bound parameter. Not only do
they show differential baseline activity under speed and accuracy
conditions, but they also show a higher rate of activity at choice
time under speed conditions (Figure 6D), i.e., opposite to the
predicted activity. These data support the predictions for baseline
activity by the gate parameter, i.e., higher baseline under speed
conditions, but they do not support the prediction of differential
onset of integration. Several fMRI studies with human subjects
also show differential baseline activity under speed and accuracy
conditions in pre-motor cortical areas (Forstmann et al., 2008;
Ivanoff et al., 2008; van Maanen et al., 2011) (Section 4.3.2).
4.2.3. Modulation of the sensitivity to encoded evidence
Support for the hypothesis that integrator circuitry is more (less)
sensitive to the encoding of evidence under accuracy (speed)
conditions (Figure 5D) has been provided by a visual discrimi-
nation task, in which human subjects decided whether flashing
stimuli were of the same or slightly different orientation (Ho
et al., 2012). As expected, decisions were slower and more accu-
rate under the accuracy condition (vice versa for speed). Because
the neural mechanisms underlying fine discrimination of orien-
tation are well-studied, these authors focused on trials on which
the stimuli differed (mismatch trials). In particular, off-target
neurons (tuned away from the stimulus) are hypothesized to be
more informative for fine discrimination than on-target neu-
rons (tuned toward the stimulus), due to the steeper slope of
their tuning curves at off-target orientations (see Scolari and
Serences, 2012). This computational principle is depicted in
Figure 8. In the study by Ho et al. (2012), there was no dif-
ference between blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)
based orientation tuning curves in primary visual cortex (V1)
under speed and accuracy conditions, suggesting that these con-
ditions did not modulate the encoding of evidence on mismatch
trials. However, off-target activation (tuned away from the tar-
get orientation) was higher on correct trials than error trials
under the accuracy condition, that is, subjects were more accu-
rate when off-target activation was higher. This finding suggests
that subjects were more accurate when the gain of off-target
neurons was higher, which further suggests that accuracy was
higher because integrator populations detected this higher gain.
Conversely, BOLD-based tuning curves did not differ on cor-
rect and error trials under the speed condition, suggesting that
integrator populations did not detect fluctuations in the gain of
off-target neurons (or on-target neurons). Taken together, the
speed and accuracy data suggest that integrator populations are
more sensitive to (more informative) off-target activity under
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 236 | 9
Standage et al. On the neural implementation of the speed-accuracy trade-off
FIGURE 8 | SAT mechanism hypothesized by Ho et al. (2012). Small
changes to a stimulus feature do not elicit much change in the response by
neurons that are highly selective for the feature (on-target neurons). Here,
the feature is orientation. The solid and dashed vertical lines on the left
correspond to feature values of 0◦ and slightly greater than 0◦ respectively.
The change in response by a neuron maximally responsive to 0◦ is shown
by the corresponding horizontal lines abutting the black curve. The solid and
dashed vertical lines on the right correspond to feature values of 45◦ and a
slight increase from 45◦ respectively. The change in response by the same
neuron (maximally responsive to 0◦) is shown by the corresponding
horizontal lines abutting the black curve. For a given change in feature value,
the difference in the off-target response is greater than the difference in the
on-target response.
accuracy conditions, resulting in higher accuracy at a cost in terms
of speed. Under speed conditions, lower sensitivity to off-target
activity would appear to support faster decisions, at a cost in
terms of accuracy.
Ho et al. (2012) did not speculate on the mechanism by which
speed (accuracy) conditions may engender lower (higher) sensi-
tivity to more informative neurons, but it is plausible that speed
conditions lower the SNR of the activity projecting to integrator
circuitry, such that the fine discrimination provided by off-target
activity is swallowed by noise. The lower firing rate of off-target
activity (see Figure 8) is consistent with this possibility. Another
possibility is that integrator circuitry is not differentially sen-
sitive to off-target activity per se, but is preferentially selective
for on-target and off-target neurons under speed and accuracy
conditions respectively. If so, lower-rate, more informative off-
target activity would take longer to accumulate to a given firing
rate than higher-rate, less informative on-target activity, account-
ing for the SAT. Our description of this possibility does not
explain how preferential selectivity would arise, but is consistent
with the higher (lower) rate of rise of movement-neuron activ-
ity under speed (accuracy) conditions shown by Heitz and Schall
(2012).
4.3. MODULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF INTEGRATED EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A CHOICE
The hypothesis that speed and accuracy are traded by the mod-
ulation of the amount of integrated evidence has received the
lion’s share of attention in mechanistic studies of the SAT, pre-
sumably because bounded integrator models are readily fit to
behavioral data by adjusting the bound (see Bogacz et al., 2010b).
Under the assumption of linear integration, changing the start-
ing point is algorithmically equivalent to changing the bound.
Under a neural instantiation of these terms, changes to the start-
ing point would be manifest in changes to the baseline activity
of integrator neurons, while changes to the bound would be
manifest in the firing rate of integrator neurons at the time of
commitment to a choice. Here, it is important to distinguish
between the amount of integrated evidence and a neural deci-
sion variable. A decision variable may have sources of input
other than the evidence (Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Doya and
Shadlen, 2012), e.g., the encoding of the prior probabilities of
the alternatives. Under this approach, mechanistic hypotheses
on the modulation of the amount of integrated evidence suf-
ficient to make a choice can immediately be grouped into two
categories: changes to non-evidence inputs to integrator circuitry
(Figure 5E), and changes to non-integrator inputs to threshold-
ing circuitry (Figure 5F). The former tend to be limited to cortical
circuitry, whereas the latter often involve cortex and the basal
ganglia (BG). We also consider a third category in this section:
changes to the connectivity mediating integrator inputs to thresh-
olding circuitry (Figure 5G). This category is distinct from the
modulation of integrated evidence described above (Section 4.2),
since no mechanistic change to the integration process is entailed
by changes to downstream connectivity. Note that these three
general, mechanistic categories share the assumption that a fixed
net input current to thresholding circuitry is required to elicit
choice behavior.
4.3.1. Adjustments to non-evidence inputs to integrator circuitry
Several theoretical studies have proposed neural mechanisms for
the SAT that involve differential levels of non-evidence inputs
to integrator circuitry under speed and accuracy conditions
(Furman and Wang, 2008; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008; Standage
et al., 2013) (Figure 5E). A large body of electrophysiological
data provides evidence for integrator activity in frontal (Kim and
Shadlen, 1999; Schall et al., 2011; Ding and Gold, 2012) and
parietal (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Thomas and Pare, 2007;
Bollimunta and Ditterich, 2011) cortical areas during decision
tasks (Section 3.1), so these theoretical studies have typically
focused on cortical circuitry. Furman andWang (2008) controlled
the SAT by providing input spike trains to all pyramidal neu-
rons in their biophysically-based cortical model, in addition to the
selective spike trains for each of the decision alternatives. We pre-
sented this model in Section 4.2.1 because spatially non-selective
input modulates the dynamics of local-circuit decision models,
changing the rate of integration. However, the model does imple-
ment an adjustment to the amount of non-evidence input to
integrator circuitry, albeit a small one.
The hypothesis that persistent activity controls the SAT by pro-
jecting non-selectively to integrator populations (Furman and
Wang, 2008; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008) is consistent with fMRI
data from a Simon task (van Veen et al., 2008), in which human
subjects responded to the color of a stimulus to the left or right
of fixation, while ignoring its location. This study showed an
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increased baseline (sustained) BOLD response in dlPFC under
speed conditions relative to accuracy conditions, and an increased
transient (associated with the decision process) BOLD response
in the intraparietal lobule, a parietal area that may correspond
to LIP in monkeys. As noted above, persistent activity has been
recorded from dlPFC in studies of working memory (Fuster,
1973; Funahashi et al., 1989) and decision-correlated activity
has been recorded from LIP in decision tasks (Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002; Thomas and Pare, 2007), so it is plausible that
dlPFC projects a stronger (weaker) control signal to integra-
tor neurons in the intraparietal lobule under speed (accuracy)
conditions, controlling the speed and accuracy of decisions.
This possibility is consistent with increased (decreased) baseline
activity by putative integrator neurons under speed (accuracy)
conditions in the study by Heitz and Schall (2012) (Section
4.2.1), as well as with the modulation of the rate of integra-
tion by a stationary, non-selective signal (Furman and Wang,
2008).
The SAT is also controlled by non-selective excitation of inte-
grator circuitry in the model by Standage et al. (2013). As
described in Section 4.2.1, the major difference between this
neural model and the one by Furman and Wang (2008) is the
information content of the non-evidence input. In the model by
Standage et al. (2013), the non-evidence input is an estimate of
elapsed time relative to a deadline, implemented by the desta-
bilization of background activity by strong recurrent dynamics.
Like the model by Furman and Wang (2008), this model con-
trols the SAT by modulation of the rate of integration (Section
4.2.1), but nonetheless, it does implement a time-dependent, uni-
form input to integrators. This input builds upmore (less) rapidly
under speed (accuracy) conditions.
4.3.2. Adjustments to non-integrator inputs to thresholding circuitry
A number of mechanistic hypotheses on the SAT are based
on the premise that the amount of integrated evidence suffi-
cient to make a choice is controlled by spatially non-selective
input to thresholding circuitry (Frank, 2006; Simen et al., 2006;
Forstmann et al., 2010; Green et al., 2012) (Figure 5F). According
to this premise, stronger non-selective input allows lower lev-
els of integrator activity to elicit a choice. The hypotheses differ
according the processing pathways providing the non-selective
inputs, and in the corresponding information content provided
by these signals. Many of these hypotheses involve BG, owing to
its well-established role in movement initiation (choice behavior
in the present context). Excitatory input to BG arrives at the stria-
tum, which inhibits the output nuclei along the so-called direct
pathway. The output nuclei inhibit motor circuitry in their tonic
(background, default) state, so excitation of the striatum releases
motor circuitry from inhibition, enabling choice behavior (See
Figure 9A).
It has been proposed that an estimate of reward rate could
provide spatially non-selective input to thresholding circuitry,
computed by leaky integration of reward signals (Simen et al.,
2006). Such a mechanism could approximate the optimal trade-
off between speed and accuracy in terms of reward-rate maxi-
mization, without speed or accuracy instructions (Simen et al.,
2006). In effect, the strength of non-selective input tracks reward
FIGURE 9 | (A) Basal ganglia (BG) pathways hypothesized to control the
SAT. Along the direct pathway, cortex (Ctx) excites the striatum (Str), which
in turn inhibits the BG output nuclei (OP). The output nuclei project tonic
inhibition to the circuitry driving motor execution of decisions (M), i.e.,
choices. Less integrator activity is required to make a choice when the
striatum is diffusely excited by non-integrator cortical activity. Along the
hyper-direct pathway, cortex excites the subthalamic nucleus (STN), which
in turn excites the output nuclei. More integrator activity is required to
make a choice when STN is diffusely excited by non-integrator cortical
activity. The dotted arcs through the globus pallidus (GPe) depict two
further pathways that could influence the SAT in an opposite manner to the
direct and hyperdirect pathways respectively. Routes back to cortex via the
thalamus (T) are also depicted by dotted arcs, largely unexplored in this
context. (B) Distributed system of brain regions correlated with decision
making and the SAT. Data and theory suggest that executive cortical areas
(here PFC) project non-selectively to integrator populations (here posterior
parietal cortex PPC) and to pre-motor areas (PMC). A stronger (weaker)
non-selective signal thus favors speed (accuracy) by increasing (decreasing)
the strength of recurrent dynamics among integrator populations
(Figure 3B) and by decreasing the rate of their activity required for choice
behavior.
rate under thismechanism. It is plausible that such a non-selective
signal could be implemented in PFC by the increased occupancy
of D1 dopamine receptors, due to slow extrasynaptic uptake
(Grace, 1991; Dreyer et al., 2010). The activity of dopamine (DA)
neurons in BG is extensively correlated with reward and these
neurons project diffusely to PFC (and other association cortical
areas), where D1 receptors are hypothesized to control attrac-
tor dynamics in support of persistent, goal-directed activity (see
Durstewitz and Seamans, 2006). It is therefore possible that the
rate of persistent activity in PFC could provide a reward esti-
mate to BG, which gates choice behavior. It is not clear how such
a reward-rate signal would adapt to the imposition of speed or
accuracy conditions on cue, i.e., the proposedmechanism extracts
an appropriate strength of signal for a given condition, but would
presumably require an additional mechanism to switch between
speed and accuracy modes from trial to trial.
Timing signals are another potential source of non-selective
input to thresholding circuitry. Under this hypothesis, the SAT is
controlled by the balance between selective input from integra-
tor populations and non-selective input from neural populations
encoding elapsed time. In the study by Green et al. (2012),
human subjects performed an RDM task under reward schedules
corresponding to speed and accuracy conditions. Subjects’ behav-
ior was fit by a bounded integrator model, where adjustments
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to the bound were correlated with reward rate on an individ-
ual subject basis, i.e., subjects whose behavior was captured by
larger adjustments to the bound earned more reward. Because
a higher (lower) bound supports more (less) integration, this
correlation suggests that subjects traded speed accuracy by con-
trolling the amount of integrated evidence sufficient to make a
choice. Using fMRI, these authors showed higher activation in
dlPFC under the accuracy condition, and higher activation in
the cerebellum under the speed condition. They further consid-
ered correlations between activation in each of these regions and
that in the striatum (the effective connectivity). Note that the
striatum is hypothesized to control response thresholds and thus
choice behavior (see below). The effective connectivity between
dlPFC and the striatum was higher under the accuracy condi-
tion and was positively correlated with the difference (high-low)
between the value of the bound parameter under the two condi-
tions. The effective connectivity between the cerebellum and the
striatumwas higher under the speed condition and was negatively
correlated with this difference. Striatal activation did not differ
between conditions, consistent with a fixed threshold. Because
earlier studies have provided evidence for integrator activity in
dlPFC during decisions (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Heekeren et al.,
2004; Philiastides et al., 2011) and for sub-second timing in
the cerebellum (see Lewis and Miall, 2003; Ivry and Spencer,
2004), it was hypothesized that persistent changes in connec-
tivity mediate response modes for the purpose of maximizing
reward. Thus, the balance between cortico-striatal and cerebellar-
striatal processing could control the SAT. This study switched
speed and accuracy conditions between blocks, but each block
contained very few trials (approximately 10). Subjects therefore
adapted quickly to task conditions, suggesting that the underly-
ing mechanism may be capable of switching from trial to trial
on cue.
The study by Green et al. (2012) is not the only MRI study to
implicate the striatum in the SAT. In the study by Forstmann et al.
(2008), the BOLD signal in the pre-supplementary motor area
(pre-SMA) and the striatum was stronger in response to a pre-
trial cue indicating speed conditions in an RDM task, compared
to accuracy or neutral conditions. When individual subject’s
behavioral data were fit by a bounded accumulator model, the
magnitude of adjustments to the bound were positively corre-
lated with the BOLD signal in these areas, i.e., subjects whose
behavior was captured by larger adjustments showed greater
activation in pre-SMA and striatum. The strength of connec-
tivity between pre-SMA and striatum has also been correlated
with individual subjects’ adjustments to the bound in an RDM
task, i.e., subjects whose behavior was captured by larger adjust-
ments to the bound showed greater connectivity between these
areas, as determined by structual MRI (sMRI) (Forstmann et al.,
2010).
In the study by Ivanoff et al. (2008), human subjects performed
an RDM task with growing motion coherence under speed and
accuracy conditions. These authors classified their results accord-
ing to “baseline trials” and “coherence trials,” where the coherence
of moving dots was 0% (over a full trial) and greater than 0%
respectively. The underlying premise of this classification is that
baseline trials did not provide evidence for integration, but rather,
provided only noise; whereas coherence trials provided evidence
and noise. The BOLD signal in pre-SMA and posterior lateral
prefrontal cortex (plPFC) was higher on baseline trials under
the speed condition, and was higher on coherence trials under
the accuracy condition. Furthermore, the difference in activation
under speed and accuracy conditions on baseline trials was equal
and opposite to that on coherence trials across subjects, i.e., the
speed-minus-accuracy difference on baseline trials equaled the
accuracy-minus-speed difference on coherence trials. These data
suggest that baseline activity in these cortical regions determines
the amount of integrated evidence sufficient to make a choice.
In other words, the integrated evidence on coherence trials may
account for the difference in activation between speed and accu-
racy conditions. If so, this equal, opposite difference should be
found on a within-subject basis. It was found in pre-SMA, but
not in plPFC.
Ivanoff et al. (2008) further showed that on coherence tri-
als, a measure of subjects’ decision criteria [the criterion metric
of signal detection theory (Macmillan and Creelman, 1991)]
was correlated with the BOLD signal in plPFC, but not in pre-
SMA. This finding suggests that speed and accuracy conditions
modulate the amount of evidence integrated by plPFC. These
authors sub-classified their coherence trials according to the level
of coherence at the time of subjects’ decisions, defining “hits”
and “false alarms” as trials on which coherence was positive and
0% at decision time respectively. The BOLD signal in pre-SMA
was equal in both classes of trial. Under the assumption that
brain regions supporting the integration of evidence should show
greater activity on hits than false alarms (because there is evidence
to integrate), these data support the hypothesis that evidence
is not integrated in pre-SMA. Conversely, activation in plPFC
was greater on hits than false alarms, suggesting that plPFC sup-
ports integration in the task. Overall, the study by Ivanoff et al.
(2008) supports the hypothesis that pre-SMA plays an “adaptive
baseline” role in the SAT, determining the amount of evidence
integrated in cortical areas such as plPFC. Taken together, the
studies by Forstmann et al. (2008), Forstmann et al. (2010), and
Ivanoff et al. (2008) suggest that pre-SMA projects non-selectively
to the striatum, where this activity is added to selective inputs
from cortical integrator populations.
The above studies were extended by van Maanen et al.
(2011), who considered the mechanisms by which subjects switch
between response modes for speed and accuracy. Under speed
conditions, trial-to-trial changes in the BOLD signal in pre-SMA
were positively correlated with estimates of the starting point of
accumulation in a single-trial version of a bounded accumula-
tor model, in which the bound was fixed. In this case, a higher
starting point has the same effect as a lower bound, i.e., faster,
less accurate decisions. These data further support the hypothesis
that pre-SMA provides a non-selective control signal to the stria-
tum, governing the SAT. On trials that imposed a switch between
speed and accuracy conditions (in either direction), a positive
correlation was also found between BOLD changes in the ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the starting point. Interestingly,
only switches from accuracy to speed were correlated with activa-
tion of the striatum, suggesting that switching between response
modes may be asymmetric, i.e., different mechanisms may
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mediate switching from a speed mode to an accuracy mode than
vice versa.
The study by van Maanen et al. (2011) further showed that
under accuracy conditions, BOLD changes in ACCwere positively
correlated with changes in the starting point in their model, but
only on trials following an error. These data suggest that ACCmay
contribute to an emphasis on accuracy, consistent with a neural
model of cortico-BG circuitry in which cortical conflict detection
excites the subthalamic nucleus (STN) (Frank, 2006; Frank et al.,
2007). Note that ACC is believed to play a role in conflict moni-
toring (Yeung et al., 2004). The model is based on earlier neural
models of action selection (Gurney et al., 2001), in which rewards
are associated with salient stimuli. In the model by Frank (2006),
conflict arises when multiple rewarding (or unrewarding) stimuli
occur simultaneously. Cortex detects this “conflict” and projects
to STN, which in turn prevents action selection by inhibiting
motor circuitry. The model thereby implements dynamic thresh-
old adaptation, increasing the amount of evidence sufficient to
make a choice during difficult decisions.
The underlying premises of this “STN hypothesis” (Bogacz
et al., 2010b) are further supported by studies of response inhibi-
tion in “stop-signal” tasks, in which subjects are cued to withhold
planned responses on a proportion of trials (Stop trials). The
“direct” and “hyperdirect” pathways have been correlated with
Go trials (without the stopping cue) and Stop trials respec-
tively (Aron and Poldrack, 2006), suggesting that activation of
the striatum speeds up responding and activation of STN slows
it down. These data therefore suggest that speed and accuracy
conditions may preferentially activate the direct and hyperdi-
rect pathways respectively (Figure 9A). As described above, speed
conditions have been correlated with fronto-striatal circuitry in a
number of neuroimaging studies of the SAT (Forstmann et al.,
2008; Ivanoff et al., 2008; Forstmann et al., 2010; van Maanen
et al., 2011). However, we are unaware of any study to show a
positive correlation between STN (activity or connectivity) and
accuracy conditions, or a negative correlation between STN and
speed conditions. The small size of STN may be a factor in this
regard. The present neuroimaging data can therefore be consid-
ered to support the notion that accuracy conditions correspond
to a “default” mode of decision making, modulated by speed
conditions (van Veen et al., 2008; van Maanen et al., 2011). If
so, switching between speed and accuracy response modes from
trial to trial would only need involve fronto-striatal circuitry,
as described above (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010; Ivanoff et al.,
2008). The fMRI data by van Maanen et al. (2011) suggest a more
complex state of affairs, but it seems plausible that under this
“striatal hypothesis” (Bogacz et al., 2010b), some baseline level
of fronto-striatal activation corresponds to a default mode, where
speed and accuracy conditions increase and decrease activation
respectively.
4.3.3. Adjustments to the connectivity between integrators and
thresholding circuitry
The hypothesis that the SAT is supported by adjustments to
the connectivity between integrators and thresholding circuitry
(Figure 5G) has been implemented in a biophysically-based,
coupled-circuit model of eye-movement decisions (Lo andWang,
2006). In the model, the integration of evidence occurs in cortex
and projects directly to the superior colliculus (SC) by excitatory
synaptic connectivity, and indirectly via the striatum and sub-
stantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr). Note that SC is extensively
correlated with eye-movement decisions (e.g., Dorris andMunoz,
1998; Thevarajah et al., 2009). SC is tonically inhibited by SNr, so
the latter pathway is disinhibitory. These authors assumed that
the pre-saccadic reduction in tonic SNr activity occurs abruptly,
rather than smoothly, so SC burst neurons were inactive in the
model until SNr was sufficiently inhibited by the striatum. As
such, burst neurons detected threshold-crossing by cortical inte-
grator neurons, and consequently, burst firing was much more
sensitive to changes in the conductance strength of cortico-striatal
synapses than cortico-SC synapses. By tuning the conductance
strength of cortico-striatal synapses between blocks of trials, the
model traded speed for accuracy. Stronger (weaker) conduc-
tance entailed lower (higher) integrator rates under speed (accu-
racy) conditions, but for a given conductance strength (a given
speed/accuracy condition), integrator rates were fixed across task
difficulty (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008).
Note that the model does not appear suited to the trial-to-trial
switching of speed and accuracy modes on cue, owing to the
timescales of synaptic plasticity.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Under the framework of bounded integration, there are three gen-
eral classes of hypothesis on the neural implementation of the
SAT: differential modulation of the encoding of evidence under
speed and accuracy conditions (Figure 5A), differential modula-
tion of the integration of encoded evidence (Figures 5B–D), and
differential modulation of the amount of integrated evidence suf-
ficient to make a choice (Figures 5E–G). The first category has
received the least attention, but the recent study by Heitz and
Schall (2012) provides strong evidence for the modulation of
sensory encoding (Section 4.1).
Hypotheses on the differential modulation of integration
under speed and accuracy conditions can be sub-classified
according to the rate (Section 4.2.1) and onset (Section 4.2.2)
of integration, and the sensitivity of integrator circuitry to the
encoding of evidence (Section 4.2.3). There is considerable evi-
dence for the first of these hypotheses. The rate of rise of puta-
tive integrator activity has been shown to increase and decrease
under speed and accuracy conditions respectively (Heitz and
Schall, 2012). This activity can be explained by attractor mod-
els (Figures 3, 7), in which speed (accuracy) conditions increase
(decrease) the rate of the evolution of competitive dynamics.
At least three neural models have demonstrated that a cognitive
signal could control the SAT in this manner by projecting non-
selectively to integrator circuitry, either by persistent mnemonic
activity (Furman and Wang, 2008; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008) or
by climbing activity encoding elapsed time relative to a deadline
(Standage et al., 2013).
Hypotheses on the amount of integrated evidence sufficient
to make a choice can be sub-classified according to adjust-
ments to non-evidence inputs to integrator circuitry (Section
4.3.1), adjustments of non-integrator inputs to thresholding cir-
cuitry (Section 4.3.2) and adjustments to the connectivity from
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integrator circuitry to thresholding circuitry (Section 4.3.3).
According to the first of these hypotheses, if choice behavior
requires a fixed level of activity by integrator neurons, then more
(less) evidence will be required to reach this fixed level if less
(more) common input is provided to all integrators. Attractor
models suggest that this mechanism may be impossible to dis-
entangle from the modulation of the rate of integration, since
an increase in spatially non-selective excitation decreases their
effective time constants, i.e., it increases the rate of integration.
Spatially non-selective excitation, however, is not necessarily syn-
onymous with a common input to integrators. The former entails
a common input to integrator neurons and other neurons in the
local circuitry not receiving evidence. The latter does not neces-
sarily include these other neurons. We are unaware of any studies
to systematically consider the modulation of recurrent dynam-
ics according to this difference, but the dynamics of attractor
networks are known to be influenced by the size of integrator
populations relative to the number of neurons in these networks
(Albantakis and Deco, 2009).
Our description of the role of BG in the adjustment of
non-integrator inputs to thresholding circuitry has not consid-
ered bidirectional connectivity between cortex and BG via the
thalamus, which complicates the interpretation of information
flow during decisions (Figure 9A). The different spatial profiles
of cortico-BG-thalamo-cortical loops further complicate things,
since information from different cortical areas may be processed
discretely within BG and returned to the areas of origin, may
be integrated within BG and returned to all regions of ori-
gin, or may be partially integrated (see Nambu, 2011). Further
to these complications, there are multiple processing pathways
though BG. The direct and hyperdirect pathways are described
above, but there is also an “indirect” pathway to the output
nuclei, via the external segment of the globus pallidus (GPe,
Figure 9A). GPe receives inhibitory projections from the stria-
tum and makes inhibitory projections to the output nuclei. The
indirect pathway thus “counteracts” the direct pathway, i.e., exci-
tation of the striatum disinhibits motor circuitry along the direct
pathway, while effectively inhibiting it via the indirect pathway
(dis-disinhibition). Interestingly, STN makes excitatory projec-
tions to GPe, so the hyperdirect pathway also has a counteracting
pathway, i.e., excitation of STN inhibits motor circuitry, but
also disinhibits it via GPe (see Nambu, 2011). Thus, interpret-
ing correlations between SAT behavior and activation of BG
input and output nuclei is complicated by the paths this activity
may follow, with each path supporting different computations.
Extensive discussion of these possibilities is beyond the scope
of this review, but assumptions about these and other anatomi-
cal factors influence the interpretation of the experimental data
presented here.
The possibility of “self-modulation” of decision dynamics
(Section 4.3.2) also warrants further comment. The cortico-BG
model by Frank (2006) includes a cortical conflict detection area
(potentially ACC) that raises the threshold for choice behavior
by projecting to STN. Thus, more difficult tasks more strongly
activate this area during decisions, raising the threshold. At first
glance, this possibility appears to conflict with bounded integra-
tor models in which reward rate is maximized by lowering the
bound during decisions (Ditterich, 2006a; Drugowitsch et al.,
2012). As noted in Section 4.2.1, lowering the decision crite-
rion reduces time-wasting because it speeds up decisions that
are more likely to be wrong, but this approach may not be ideal
under stringent accuracy conditions, e.g., when errors are pun-
ished by long timeouts. In this case, raising the criterion could
be the better strategy. This discrepancy highlights the potential
utility of separate mechanisms for speed and accuracy empha-
sis: it is not immediately clear how a single neural mechanism
could implement the within-trial increase in the bound under
accuracy conditions and decrease in the bound under speed
conditions.
5.1. PREDICTIONS FOR FUTURE EXPERIMENTS
Different classes of hypothesis on the SAT make different pre-
dictions for experimental testing, as do different models within
these classes. For instance, the hypothesis that the SAT is con-
trolled by adjustments to non-evidence input to integrator cir-
cuitry (Section 4.3.1) makes a different prediction about the rate
of integrator activity at the time of commitment to a choice
than the hypothesis that the SAT is controlled by adjustments to
non-integrator inputs to thresholding circuitry (Section 4.3.2) or
adjustments to the connectivity between integrator circuitry and
thresholding circuitry. Assuming a fixed current is required for
choice selection, adjustments to non-evidence input to integrator
circuitry imply the same rate of integrator activity at choice time
across task conditions, whereas an increase (decrease) in non-
integrator input to thresholding circuitry under speed (accuracy)
conditions implies a lower (higher) rate of integrator activity at
choice time, as does stronger (weaker) connectivity between these
circuits. The only available single-cell data conflict with the latter
mechanisms, showing a higher rate of putative integrator activity
under speed conditions (Heitz and Schall, 2012). These authors
showed that leakage by the circuitry enacting the choice could
account for the difference in rate, an explanation that supports
the former mechanism.
The conflict between the prediction of lower (higher) inte-
grator rates under speed (accuracy) conditions and electrophys-
iological data (Heitz and Schall, 2012) raises several points of
caution. Firstly, the experimental studies providing evidence for
the adjustment of non-integrator inputs to thresholding circuitry
employed perceptual tasks in which humans made their choices
by manually pressing a button (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010;
Ivanoff et al., 2008; van Veen et al., 2008; Green et al., 2012),
whereas the electrophysiological data were recorded during a
task in which non-human primates made their choices with an
eye-movement. We are comfortable ignoring inter-species dif-
ferences at this stage of the game, but it is plausible that the
pathways from frontal regions to primary motor cortex are qual-
itatively different in relation to the SAT than those from FEF
to eye-movement circuitry (as in Heitz and Schall, 2012). On
the other hand, the striatal hypothesis (Section 4.3.2) does not
require that non-selective excitation of the striatum be provided
by the same cortical area across response modalities. Here, it is
worth noting that FEF projects directly to the circuitry mediating
eye movements, but also projects to this circuitry along a path-
way through the striatum, substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr)
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and SC. Because SNr tonically inhibits SC, the latter pathway
potentially provides an eye-movement “version” of the striatal
hypothesis described above in the context of manual movements.
Suffice to say, it would be informative to run the RDM task used
by Forstmann et al. (2008) in an eye-movement paradigm.
Different models that account for the SAT by the modulation
of the rate of integration (Section 4.2.1) make different predic-
tions about the weighting of evidence during decisions. Stationary
attractor models (Furman and Wang, 2008; Roxin and Ledberg,
2008) predict a primacy effect (Wong et al., 2007), i.e., earlier
evidence is weighted more heavily than later evidence. In effect,
attractor dynamics amplify a decision variable, so earlier evi-
dence is subject to amplification for longer. This prediction by
stationary attractor models contrasts with that of bounded inte-
grator models dominated by leakage, which show a recency effect
because earlier evidence is subject to leakage for longer (see e.g.,
Usher and McClelland, 2001). In time-dependent attractor mod-
els (Standage et al., 2011, 2013), if the dynamics are weak at the
start of a trial, then a decision variable is dominated by early leak-
age and late amplification. As such, the evidence will be most
heavily weighted somewhere in the middle (see Standage et al.,
2011). The respective predictions of these models could be tested
by changing the strength of evidence at different times during
decision trials. At least one study has conducted such an exper-
iment, using an RDM task in which the coherence of the dots
changed during a brief window at different times (Kiani et al.,
2008). These authors found a primacy effect, but they used a
fixed-duration task with a flat hazard rate, i.e., subjects responded
on cue, but it was impossible to determine when the cue would
arrive. It would therefore have been impossible to encode elapsed
time relative to the cue. Running the same task with a fully
predictable duration would be highly informative.
5.2. EVIDENCE FOR LIMITED INTEGRATION
It is not universally assumed that the neural mechanisms underly-
ing decisions implement the principles of bounded integration as
described above (Section 3). In the model by Cisek et al. (2009),
momentary evidence is multiplied by elapsed time and a decision
is made when the resulting quantity exceeds a decision bound.
Because decisions would be susceptible to noise without tem-
poral integration, the authors proposed that noisy evidence is
low-passed filtered before being multiplied. A low-pass filter can
be thought of as a leaky integrator with a short time constant, so
the main difference between this “urgency-gating” model and a
leaky integrator with a decreasing bound (see Ditterich, 2006b)
is the length of the time constant of integration, i.e., how rapidly
the evidence is leaking. Cisek et al. (2009) argued that percep-
tual decisions in real-world environments are likely to depend on
fluctuating evidence, but integrators with long time constants are
not well-suited to these conditions. Consistent with these princi-
ples, they showed that the urgency-gating model could account
for behavioral data from a task with changing evidence, whereas
bounded integrator models could not. In effect, the bounded
integrators were not leaky enough.
Thura et al. (2012) extended this work by proposing that opti-
mal decisions are supported by the integration of novel informa-
tion only, where optimality was defined in terms of reward rate.
Formally, their model specifies the perfect integration of differen-
tiated evidence, where a decision is made when the running total
exceeds a decreasing bound. They showed that this procedure
is optimal under the assumption of non-independence between
sequential samples of evidence, which is likely to be the case in
most natural conditions, and they proposed that this optimal pro-
cedure can be approximated by the multiplication of low-pass
filtered evidence by a growing urgency signal. As such, the model
is equivalent to their earlier model (Cisek et al., 2009). Their mod-
els explain the SAT in tasks with changing evidence because longer
(shorter) intervals provide more (less) opportunity to integrate
changes in the evidence (novelty). Under the assumption that
response-time variability is primarily the result of between-trial
variability in attention, arousal and related factors (Carpenter and
Williams, 1995), their models further account for behavioral data
from traditional tasks with fixed (within-trial) mean evidence,
and they account for decision-correlated buildup activity (Section
3.1) under the assumption that this activity mainly reflects the
urgency to respond.
In proposing a neural approximation of the urgency-gating
model, these authors suggested that the timescale of (leaky)
integration is on the order of 100ms, consistent with evidence
that perceptual decisions are based on information from a time
window on this order (see Thura et al., 2012), but difficult to
reconcile with the SAT on timescales of many hundreds of mil-
liseconds. For example, in the random dot motion task by Palmer
et al. (2005), accuracy was lower (higher) and decision times
were shorter (longer) under a speed (accuracy) condition, where
response times were as long as around 500ms (2 s). Since the
only novel evidence was provided by stimulus onset, the urgency-
gating model would appear to predict shorter (longer) decision
times under speed (accuracy) conditions, with no change in accu-
racy, i.e., the integral would have reached its asymptote before
500ms in either condition, so additional processing time would
not improve accuracy. Under the framework of attractor dynam-
ics, however, there is no discrepancy: local-circuit dynamics are
subject to modulation, where weak dynamics support a leakage
regime and stronger dynamics support a decision regime (Section
3.1.1). As such, modulation of network dynamics by a cognitive
signal (Section 4.2.1) can support a range of time constants in the
leakage or decision regimes (see Figure 7B). From this viewpoint,
cognitive signals projecting to integrator circuitry (or evidence-
encoding circuitry) are capable of supporting the effective time
constant required by a given context, from around 100ms (Cisek
et al., 2009) to several seconds (Palmer et al., 2005). Under this
framework, weak dynamics may be a default mode for decision
circuitry under natural conditions (changing evidence), but cog-
nitively demanding tasks may recruit dynamics supporting longer
time constants.
The framework of attractor dynamics sheds further light on
the possible neural implementation of urgency-gating. A leaky
integrator with a short time constant could be implemented
by weak local-circuit dynamics, per the first processing stage of
Figure 4. In this regard, Thura et al. (2012) noted that the effect
of the urgency signal on the decision variables could be addi-
tive, not necessarily multiplicative. In the study by Standage et al.
(2011), a network model with weak dynamics was subject to gain
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 236 | 15
Standage et al. On the neural implementation of the speed-accuracy trade-off
modulation by a growing urgency signal, i.e., the urgency sig-
nal had a multiplicative effect on the decision process. Long time
constants were an emergent property of the network, suggesting
that a neural implementation of urgency-gating might require
additive input. The biophysically-based model by Standage et al.
(2013) suggests that this input would need to be spatially selec-
tive (targeting each decision variable, but not other local-circuit
neurons), since attractor dynamics (with long effective time
constants) emerged in their model with a non-selective signal
(Section 4.3.1). In principle, the urgency gating model could also
be implemented by the projection of the urgency signal to thresh-
olding circuitry, implementing a time-dependent version of the
striatal hypothesis (Section 4.3.2) with weak decision dynamics.
These and other possibilities require further investigation. Note
that there is ample evidence for urgency signals, i.e., climbing
activity encoding elapsed time (see Section 4.2.1). The ways in
which this activity may modulate decision processing are receiv-
ing considerable attention (Ditterich, 2006b; Churchland et al.,
2008; Cisek et al., 2009; Hanks et al., 2011; Standage et al.,
2011; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Standage et al., 2013). Changing-
evidence tasks represent an important direction in the study of
the SAT and decision making more generally.
5.3. DISTRIBUTED INTEGRATION OF EVIDENCE AND THE SAT
The distributed nature of decision processing is an important
consideration for all three general classes of hypothesis. For the
most part, we have described putative integrator activity one cor-
tical area at a time [e.g., dlPFC (Kim and Shadlen, 1999), LIP
(Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Thomas and Pare, 2007) and FEF
(Ding and Gold, 2012; Heitz and Schall, 2012)], highlighting the
rate of this activity at choice time in a given electrophysiological
experiment. It is likely that different decision-correlated cortical
areas encode different dimensions of a given task. Changes to the
profile of activity in these areas may therefore differ with task
conditions. For example, a higher (lower) rate of FEF movement
neurons under speed (accuracy) conditions (Heitz and Schall,
2012) may be accompanied by a lower (higher) rate of activity
in dlPFC and/or LIP. All three areas project (at least indirectly)
to the circuitry driving eye-movements. The distributed nature
of decision processing is well-appreciated by researchers in deci-
sion neuroscience, but it is often implicit in electrophysiological
studies (and studies based on electrophysiological data) that the
relevant decision variable is the one being recorded. There are
good reasons for choice thresholds to be fixed (see Marshall et al.,
2012), but a fixed choice threshold need not imply a fixed rate
of decision-selective activity in each of the brain regions project-
ing to the relevant motor circuitry. Rather, the aggregate input to
themotor circuitry may be fixed, with varying contributions from
upstream areas in different conditions.
To further complicate matters, decision-correlated brain areas
are often bidirectionally coupled (e.g., FEF, LIP, and SC), so these
areas presumably modulate each other during decisions. It is
therefore plausible that in a given area, spike rates may indeed be
fixed at the time of commitment to a choice, but that peak rates
reflect the post-decision dynamics of choice behavior (see Simen,
2012). In light of these considerations, there is a need for electro-
physiological recordings from multiple decision-correlated areas
under speed and accuracy conditions, e.g., dlPFC, LIP, and/or FEF
during eye-movement tasks. The different ways in which deci-
sion variables in these areas are modulated by speed and accuracy
conditions will not only be informative about the contributions
of these areas to the SAT, but also about the roles they play in
decision making more generally.
Similarly, the decision dynamics described above (Section
3.1.1) are based on single-circuit models, i.e., local-circuit
integration of inputs from upstream, evidence-encoding neurons.
We are unaware of any neural modeling studies to systematically
consider the dynamics of bidirectionally-coupled decision cir-
cuits. It is clear that single-circuit attractor models cannot provide
a full account of decision making. For example, these models nec-
essarily produce longer error trials than correct trials (see Wong
and Wang, 2006; Standage et al., 2011), but correct trials are
longer under some task paradigms (see Ratcliff and Smith, 2004).
5.4. A UNIFYING PERSPECTIVE
We have described the above hypotheses one at a time, largely in
isolation from one another, but as indicated in Section 4, these
hypotheses should not be considered mutually exclusive. The
electrophysiological data by Heitz and Schall (2012) are revealing
in this regard, providing evidence for the modulation of sensory
encoding, the rate of integration and the strength of non-evidence
inputs to integrator circuitry. These data are consistent with
the hypothesis that a cognitive signal projects non-selectively to
sensory-encoding populations and integrator populations, con-
trolling the SAT by gain modulation. Such a signal could be
implemented by dlPFC (van Veen et al., 2008; Wenzlaff et al.,
2011). It is possible that such a signal also projects to threshold-
ing circuitry. Unlike non-selective input to integrator circuitry,
which controls integration times in attractor models (Furman
and Wang, 2008; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008; Standage et al., 2013),
non-selective input to thresholding circuitry may have a negli-
gible effect on local-circuit dynamics, given the already-strong
dynamics hypothesized to support the implementation of thresh-
olds (Simen, 2012). Such a cognitive signal could also project to
pre-motor regions [e.g., pre-SMA (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010;
Ivanoff et al., 2008)], raising their baseline rates, in turn lowering
motor thresholds for choice behavior. This description of the SAT
assumes that the cognitive signal is present in neutral conditions,
where its rate increases and decreases under speed and accuracy
conditions respectively. This hypothesis unifies much of the data
presented above and is depicted in Figure 9B.
Despite the long history of behavioral data describing the SAT,
these are early days in its mechanistic study (Bogacz et al., 2010b).
Recent electrophysiological (Heitz and Schall, 2012), neuroimag-
ing (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010; Ivanoff et al., 2008; van Veen
et al., 2008; Wenzlaff et al., 2011; Green et al., 2012; Ho et al.,
2012) and biophysically-based modeling (Lo and Wang, 2006;
Furman and Wang, 2008; Standage et al., 2013) studies are exem-
plary of the promising methods being brought to bear on this
fundamental cognitive phenomenon.
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